---
title: Japan Labor Market Report 2026
description: "Japan's labor market in 2026: 2.5% unemployment, 5%+ wage deals, a ¥983.5bn placement market, ¥9.9tn staffing, 2.57m foreign workers, and AI reshaping hiring."
image: https://nobusato.jp/hubfs/labor-market-report-2026-cover-en.png
---

[Nobu Sato](https://nobusato.jp/en?hsLang=en)

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[Japan by the Numbers](https://nobusato.jp/en/blog/tag/japan-by-the-numbers)

# Japan Labor Market Report 2026

![](https://nobusato.jp/hubfs/labor-market-report-2026-cover-en.png)

## Executive summary

Japan's labor market in late 2026 combines very low unemployment, cooling hiring demand, a labor supply that has nearly peaked, and wages rising at the fastest pace in three decades. Five points matter most for leadership:

1. **Demand is cooling, but the shortage is structural.** Unemployment is 2.5% and the job-openings ratio has eased from 1.31 (2023) to 1.18 (Aug 2026). Yet employers report the deepest staffing shortage in years, and labor-shortage bankruptcies hit a record 427 in 2025.
2. **Supply growth is running out.** The labor force passed 70 million in 2025, but only because more women and seniors are working. Births fell to 671,000 in 2025; the working-age population will shrink by about 11 million by 2040. Foreign workers (2.57 million, +11.7%) now supply over half of net employment growth.
3. **Wages are resetting upward.** Shunto pay settlements exceeded 5% for a third straight year (5.01% in 2026). Real wages have been positive every month of 2026 so far. The minimum wage rose to ¥1,177/hour, up 26.6% in five years.
4. **The staffing and recruitment industries are at record size but splitting.** Recruitment-agency fees reached ¥983.5bn in FY2024 (+17.6%); temporary staffing sales reached ¥9.9tn (+9.4%). Growth is concentrated in high-salary, IT/digital and platform-based models. Medical recruitment faces a likely fee cap.
5. **AI is shrinking entry points, not yet cutting jobs.** The government finds no evidence of large AI-driven job losses. But clerical job postings have fallen sharply, and 23% of major firms plan to cut graduate hiring for 2027. Screening is shifting from CVs to AI interviews.

| Indicator | Latest value | Period |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Unemployment rate | 2.5% | Aug 2026 |
| Job-openings-to-applicants ratio | 1.18 | Aug 2026 |
| Labor force | 70.04 million | 2025 average |
| Foreign workers | 2.57 million (+11.7%) | Oct 2025 |
| Shunto wage settlement (Rengo) | 5.01% | 2026 |
| Minimum wage (national weighted avg.) | ¥1,177/hour | FY2026 |
| Recruitment-agency fee revenue | ¥983.5bn (+17.6%) | FY2024 |
| Temporary staffing sales | ¥9.90tn (+9.4%) | FY2024 |

Sources for each figure are given in the sections below. Japanese terms appear in parentheses on first use; ¥100 million = ¥0.1bn.

## Labor market conditions

### Unemployment at 2.5%, hiring demand easing

Unemployment was 2.5% in August 2026, within a 2.4–2.7% band for over two years ([MIC Labour Force Survey](https://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/sokuhou/tsuki/pdf/gaiyou.pdf)). Employment stands at 68.5 million. The job-openings ratio (有効求人倍率) fell to 1.18 and new job postings dropped 3.4% year on year ([MHLW, Aug 2026](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/newpage_76397.html)). The decline comes from fewer openings, not more job seekers.

1.001.502.001.00 = one opening per applicant● Active openings ratio● New openings ratio1.311.182.062020202120222023202420252026/8

**Fig.1**The job-openings ratio has eased from 1.31 (2023) to 1.18 (Aug 2026). Annual averages; Aug 2026 seasonally adjusted. Source: JILPT key labor statistics 0208 (2020–2025 averages); MHLW General Employment Placement Situation, Aug 2026

The ratio for full-time regular jobs has sat at exactly 1.00 since August 2025. Tokyo is the tightest market at 1.70 (by place of application). Note that public employment offices now handle only about 10% of placements, down from 30% in 2009, so this indicator understates white-collar demand ([MHLW White Paper 2025](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/wp/hakusyo/roudou/25/dl/25-1-1-2_02.pdf)).

### Employers still report a severe shortage

The Bank of Japan's Tankan employment index was −38 in September 2026, and −42 for small and mid-sized firms — their worst reading in the series ([BOJ Tankan](https://www.boj.or.jp/statistics/tk/yoshi/tk2609.htm)). 51.3% of companies report a shortage of regular employees, led by finance (67.1%), construction (66.0%) and logistics (65.6%) ([Teikoku Databank, Jul 2026](https://www.tdb.co.jp/report/economic/20260817-laborshortage202607/)).

Labor-shortage bankruptcies reached a record 427 in 2025 (+24.9%) and 227 in the first half of 2026 ([Teikoku Databank](https://www.zaikei.co.jp/releases/3253125/)). The driver is shifting from "cannot hire" to "cannot afford rising labor costs" — 54% of recent cases ([Tokyo Shoko Research](https://www.logi-today.com/1007621)).

### Employment is shifting to regular contracts; job-change intent at a record

Regular employees rose for the 11th straight year to 37.1 million in 2025; the non-regular share fell to 36.3% by August 2026 ([MIC](https://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/sokuhou/nen/ft/pdf/youyaku.pdf)). Actual job changers numbered 3.3 million, but 10.2 million people said they want to change jobs — a record and about three times the number who moved ([MIC](https://www.stat.go.jp/info/mail/pdf/20260213_no1836.pdf)). This gap is the core addressable pool for recruiters.

### Shortage is concentrated in field occupations

| Occupation | Openings ratio, Aug 2026 |
| --- | --- |
| Security | 6.99 |
| Construction and mining | 5.10 |
| Care work | 3.89 |
| Medical technicians | 3.21 |
| Drivers | 2.54 |
| IT and telecom engineers | 1.33 |
| Clerical | 0.37 |
| All occupations | 1.06 |

Source: [MHLW reference tables, Aug 2026](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11602000/001753011.pdf). IT looks loose in public-office data, but 66.7% of IT services firms report shortages; IT hiring runs mainly through private channels ([Teikoku Databank, Apr 2026](https://www.zaikei.co.jp/releases/3437421/)).

### Policy: labor-law overhaul postponed

A major Labor Standards Act reform (mandatory rest intervals, caps on consecutive working days) was not submitted to the 2026 Diet; working-hour rules are unlikely to change before 2027 ([jinjer](https://hcm-jinjer.com/blog/jinji/labor-standards-act_amendment/)). Employment to age 65 became fully mandatory in April 2025; only 34.8% of firms offer work to age 70 ([MHLW](https://www.kaiketsu-j.com/?p=19876)).

## Workforce supply

### Population: 123 million and falling

The 2025 census counted 122.97 million people, down 3.17 million (−2.5%) from 2020; only Tokyo grew ([MIC Census 2025](https://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2025/kekka/pdf/outline_01.pdf)). Working-age people (15–64) were 73.5 million (59.8%); those 65+ were 29.4%. The Japanese population fell 3.4% in five years, while foreign residents grew 44% to 3.46 million.

Official projections (IPSS, medium case) put the working-age population at 70.8 million in 2030, 62.1 million in 2040 and 55.4 million in 2050 ([IPSS via secondary source](https://www.wic-net.com/material/static/00009719/00009719.pdf)). The 2025–2040 decline is roughly 11 million people.

### Participation has carried growth — and is nearing its limit

The labor force reached 70.04 million in 2025, a first, with participation at 63.8% ([MIC 2025 average](https://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/sokuhou/nen/ft/pdf/youyaku.pdf)). Since 2015 the labor force grew 3.79 million while the working-age population fell over 4 million; all of the gain came from higher participation.

- **Women:** participation for ages 25–34 is 88.4%; the old "M-curve" dip around childbirth has essentially disappeared. The remaining gap is quality: the share of women in regular jobs peaks at 62.8% in their late 20s, then falls ([Gender Equality White Paper 2026](https://www.gender.go.jp/about_danjo/whitepaper/r08/zentai/html/honpen/b1_s02_01.html)).
- **Seniors:** 9.43 million people aged 65+ work (13.8% of all workers); 54.5% of those aged 65–69 are employed ([MIC](https://www.stat.go.jp/data/topics/pdf/topics149.pdf)). But 76% are non-regular, and annual gains have slowed to +130,000.

### New graduates: a 40% smaller cohort by 2043

Japan recorded 671,236 births in 2025, the tenth straight record low, with a fertility rate of 1.14 ([MHLW Vital Statistics](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/geppo/nengai25/dl/gaikyouR7.pdf)). Today's 18-year-old cohort is about 1.09 million; it will be about 670,000 in 2043.

For the class of 2027 there are 1.62 university openings per graduate, down from 1.75 two years earlier. Large firms (5,000+ staff) are still adding openings (+4.0%), while SMEs are cutting (−3.5%) ([Recruit Works Institute](https://www.works-i.com/surveys/item/260423_recruitment_saiyo_ratio.pdf)). The graduate employment rate remains 98.0%.

### Shortage forecasts: up to 11 million workers by 2040

| Forecaster | Method | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [Recruit Works Institute](https://www.works-i.com/research/report/item/forecast2040.pdf) | Supply-demand gap (people) | 3.41m short | — | 11.0m short (24% of demand) |
| [Persol Research Institute](https://digitalpr.jp/r/97163) | Labor hours | — | 17.75m hours/day short (≈ 3.84m workers) | — |
| [JILPT](https://www.jil.go.jp/press/documents/20240311.pdf) — high-participation case | Employed persons | 68.6m | — | 67.3m |
| JILPT — status-quo case | Employed persons | 64.3m | — | 57.7m |

The 2040 outcome depends on whether participation rises another 4–5 points. Shortages will be worst in care (25%), retail (25%), driving (24%) and construction (22%). Clerical, technical and professional roles face only a 7% gap and may even see a surplus in 2030. Tokyo is the only prefecture with no projected shortfall, as young people keep moving there: net inflow to Greater Tokyo was 123,534 in 2025, the 30th straight year ([MIC migration report](https://www.stat.go.jp/data/idou/2025np/jissu/pdf/2025youyaku.pdf)).

## Wages and income

### Shunto: a third year above 5%

The 2026 spring wage negotiations (春闘, shunto) delivered 5.01% (¥16,400/month) in the Rengo union federation's final tally, down slightly from 5.25% in 2025 ([Rengo final tally](https://www.kaiketsu-j.com/?p=22834)). SMEs reached 4.69%, their highest since comparable data began in 2013. Base-pay increases alone were about 3.5%.

2%3%4%5%5% = union target● All firms● SMEs2.075.105.255.014.6920192020202120222023202420252026

**Fig.2**Shunto pay settlements (Rengo, %) topped 5% for a third year. SME series available from 2023. Source: Rengo tallies published by MHLW (2019–2026); Rengo 2026 final tally

Other surveys show the same picture. Large firms surveyed by Keidanren averaged 5.37% (¥19,752, the largest yen increase since 1976); IT and telecom led at 8.28%, construction at 6.76%, while finance trailed at 2.97% ([JILPT, Oct 2026](https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/blt/backnumber/2026/10/other_05.html)). Including non-union firms, economy-wide raises are closer to 4.4% ([Dai-ichi Life Research](https://www.dlri.co.jp/files/ld/560678.pdf)).

### Real wages have turned positive

Real wages fell four years running in 2022–2025, as inflation outpaced pay. In 2026 they have been positive every month through August (+1.5%), with nominal pay up 3.8% ([MHLW Monthly Labour Survey](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/itiran/roudou/monthly/r08/2608p/dl/pdf2608p.pdf)). Part-time hourly pay rose faster (+4.3%), driven by minimum wage hikes. Economists expect core inflation above 3% around year-end, which could briefly push real wages negative again ([Dai-ichi Life Research](https://www.dlri.co.jp/report/macro/666390.html)).

### Minimum wage: ¥1,177 and rising about 5% a year

9029309611,0041,0551,1211,177FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025FY2026

**Fig.3**National weighted average minimum wage, ¥ per hour. Up 26.6% from FY2021 to FY2026. Source: MHLW FY2026 regional minimum wages; FY2020–FY2025 compiled by Hojyokin Portal

Tokyo's minimum is ¥1,280; the lowest prefecture is ¥1,085 ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11200000/001753404.pdf)). In July 2026 the government pushed its ¥1,500 target back to "by the early 2030s". At firms with under 100 staff, an estimated 42.5% of workers earned less than the new minimum before it took effect ([Shinkin Central Bank](https://www.scbri.jp/reports/.assets/newstopics_20260819.pdf)).

### Mid-career and high-income pay

The average full-time salary is ¥4.29 million (median ¥3.84 million). Project managers average ¥7.07 million, corporate planning ¥7.03 million, HR ¥5.49 million and software engineers ¥4.35 million ([doda salary ranking](https://doda.jp/guide/heikin/syokusyu/)).

Only 6.6% of employees (about 3.4 million) earn over ¥10 million a year ([National Tax Agency](https://www.nta.go.jp/publication/statistics/kokuzeicho/minkan2025/pdf/2025_001.pdf)). Roughly 70% of them crossed that threshold by changing jobs ([JAC Recruitment survey](https://www.jac-recruitment.jp/market/knowhow/preparation/research-annualincome-10millionyen/)). Job changers placed by a major agency see larger raises: 35.8% gained 10% or more (Recruit Agent data), versus 26.7% across all job changers ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/itiran/roudou/koyou/doukou/26-1/dl/kekka_gaiyo-03.pdf)). Workers over 50 who switch jobs often take a pay cut (44.7% of those aged 50–54).

### Pay gaps by company size and industry

Average monthly pay hit a record ¥340,600 in 2025 (+3.1%), but large firms raised pay 5.7% versus 1.0% at mid-sized firms ([MHLW Wage Census](https://www.kaiketsu-j.com/?p=21324)). Starting salaries for graduates at Prime-listed companies rose 5.3% to ¥265,708, with leading firms offering ¥300,000–370,000 ([Institute of Labor Administration](https://www.rosei.or.jp/attach/labo/research/pdf/000090842.pdf)).

| Industry | Monthly base pay (¥ thousand, Jun 2025) |
| --- | --- |
| Utilities | 444.0 |
| Professional and technical services | 440.3 |
| Finance and insurance | 437.0 |
| IT and telecom | 406.0 |
| Manufacturing | 330.0 |
| Healthcare and welfare | 315.7 |
| Transport | 312.7 |
| Hospitality and food service | 277.2 |

Source: [MHLW Wage Census 2025](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/itiran/roudou/chingin/kouzou/z2025/dl/14.pdf). Keidanren is now urging members to move away from seniority pay toward job- and role-based pay (ジョブ型) ([JILPT](https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/blt/backnumber/2026/03/shunto_01.html)).

## Recruitment agency and executive search market

### Size: ¥983.5bn in fees, fragmented across 14,000 active firms

Licensed fee-charging placement agencies (有料職業紹介) earned ¥983.5bn in FY2024 (+17.6%) from 889,000 placements, an average fee of about ¥1.03 million per hire (+10.9%) ([MHLW placement report FY2024](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11600000/001683019.pdf)). FY2025 official data will not be published until March 2027. Yano Research sizes the white-collar segment alone at ¥449bn (+12.0%); the remainder is largely healthcare, care and childcare placement ([Yano Research](https://www.yano.co.jp/press-release/show/press_id/3942)).

¥323bn¥349bn¥524bn¥984bnFY2013FY2014FY2017FY2018FY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024no data

**Fig.4**Fee revenue of licensed placement agencies, FY2013–FY2024. FY2015–16 not available. Source: MHLW placement business reports, fee revenue trend (FY2013–FY2024)

The market is highly fragmented. Of 30,561 reporting offices, only 13,946 made at least one placement; 23,713 operators run a single office ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11650000/001584721.pdf)). Registrations jumped over 40% in FY2024 while placements grew only 5.3%, a sign that platforms are inflating candidate pipelines but lowering conversion.

### Players: platforms and high-end specialists are outgrowing generalists

| Company | Latest scale | Focus | Recent development |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Recruit (Recruit Agent) | HR Technology Japan ¥118.9bn FY2025 (incl. job ads) | Generalist | Expects placement recovery in H2 FY2026 ([IR](https://file.recruit-holdings.com/files/ja/Recruit_202703Q1_summary_jp.pdf)) |
| Persol Career (doda) | Career unit ¥38.7bn in Q1 FY2026 (−1.7%); placement −5.0% | Generalist, ¥6m+ salaries | Losing users after an ID merger; freelance/side-job unit +29% ([IR](https://www2.jpx.co.jp/disc/21810/140120260807514816.pdf)) |
| JAC Recruitment | ¥46.1bn FY2025 (+17.7%); 1,722 consultants | ¥8–15m salaries, foreign firms | Executive placements +31%, digital +45%; guides +15% for FY2026 ([IR](https://ir.jac-recruitment.jp/ja/investors/news/auto_20260220566762/pdfFile.pdf)) |
| Visional (BizReach) | ¥80.2bn FY2025 (+21.2%) | High-end scout platform | 36,300 client firms, 8,400 headhunters, 2.93m members ([IR](https://www2.jpx.co.jp/disc/41940/081220250911556254_tse-acedjpsm-41940-20250911341940-ixbrl.htm)) |
| en Japan (agent unit) | ¥10.9bn FY2026/3 (+9.4%) | Mid-career; AMBI database | Third-party agencies place ¥22–30bn of hires through its database ([report](https://www.bridge-salon.jp/report_bridge/pdf/20260629_4849.pdf)) |
| Robert Walters, Michael Page, Hays | Not disclosed for Japan | Foreign-capital specialist search | Hot roles in 2026: FP&A, PE/alternatives, HRBP, regulatory/QA ([RW salary survey](https://www.robertwalters.co.jp/content/dam/robert-walters-redesign/country/japan/files/others/RWJ-SS2026-Japanese.pdf)) |

Listed specialists account for only about 12% of total fees; even with Recruit and Persol, the top five or six firms hold roughly 20–30%. The rest is spread across some 14,000 small agencies.

### Fees: 30–35% contingency is the norm

Agencies typically charge 30–35% of the candidate's expected first-year salary; the legal maximum that can be filed is 50%. Typical refund terms are 80% if the hire leaves within one month, 50% within three months and 10% within six ([Recruit Agent](https://www.r-agent.com/business/knowhow/article/28954/)). Charging candidates is prohibited, except for executives earning over ¥7 million.

Healthcare is the exception. Average fees are 20–25% (doctors 22.0%, nurses 21.6%, care workers 20.2%), and hospitals rate agencies only 2.3–2.5 out of 5 ([Japan Medical Association](https://www.hospital.or.jp/site/news/file/1774494184.pdf); [MHLW survey](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11600000/001718323.pdf)). This segment generated ¥106bn in fees in FY2023.

### Regulation: low entry barrier, rising compliance load

A license requires only ¥5 million in net assets and ¥1.5 million cash per office, plus a dedicated placement manager ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11600000/001681211.pdf)). Recent and pending changes:

| Date | Change | Effect |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Jan 2025 | Ban on signing bonuses to candidates and on poaching placed hires within two years becomes a license condition | Applies to all agencies |
| Apr 2025 | Agencies must publish average fee rates by occupation ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/001525303.pdf)) | Fee transparency |
| Jan 2026 | Placement managers may cover more than one office under conditions ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/newpage_68169.html)) | Lower cost of multi-office expansion |
| Mar 2026 | Medical associations demand a legal fee cap and mandatory refunds ([request](https://www.hospital.or.jp/site/news/file/1774494184.pdf)) | Health minister "considering carefully"; no law yet |
| Sep 2026 | Guidance clarifies the line between placement and job-ad/scout platforms ([JESRA](https://www.jesra.or.jp/category/news/436/)) | Grey zone for scout and AI platforms |
| Oct 2026 | Mandatory measures against customer and candidate harassment ([JESRA](https://www.jesra.or.jp/category/news/439/)) | New conditions for accepting job orders |

The probability of a fee cap is rising, most likely limited to healthcare, care and childcare first ([Akahata, Jun 2026](https://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik26/2026-06-05/ftp2026060513_01_0.php)).

### Structural shifts

- **Direct recruiting is taking share.** The scout/direct-recruiting market was about ¥127.5bn in FY2024 and grows 19–23% a year, much faster than agencies ([Yano Research](https://www.yano.co.jp/press-release/show/press_id/3593)).
- **Agencies are squeezed for candidates.** 81.8% of agencies say finding candidates is their biggest problem; the industry sentiment index fell to 9.0 in Q2 2026 ([JESRA QPI](https://www.jesra.or.jp/enquete/202607/)). Small agencies depend on paid databases, so platforms capture much of the margin.
- **Candidates multi-register.** 73% register with two or more agencies, and only 16% accepted their final offer through an agency ([Mynavi](https://career-research.mynavi.jp/?p=111144)).
- **Healthcare is diverging.** Care-worker placements rose 25–29% in FY2024, while doctor (−18%) and nurse (−10%) placements fell ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11600000/001683019.pdf)).

No authoritative forecast for 2026–2030 agency revenue has been published.

## Temporary staffing market

### Size: ¥9.9tn, growth driven by price rather than headcount

Licensed dispatch (労働者派遣) agencies reported sales of ¥9.90tn in FY2024 (+9.4%), with about 2.2 million dispatched workers (+3.9%) ([MHLW dispatch report FY2024](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/001684019.pdf)). Yano Research puts the market at ¥9.32tn and expects staffing, placement and outplacement combined to exceed ¥10tn in FY2025 ([Yano Research](https://www.yano.co.jp/press-release/show/press_id/3942)).

¥7.6tn¥8.2tn¥8.8tn¥9.1tn¥9.9tnFY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024

**Fig.5**Annual sales of licensed temporary staffing agencies, FY2020–FY2024. Source: MHLW worker dispatch business reports, FY2020–FY2024

The Labour Force Survey counts fewer people — 1.58 million dispatched workers in Q2 2026, about 3% of employees — because it measures a point in time rather than year-end registrations ([MIC](https://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/sokuhou/4hanki/dt/pdf/gaiyou.pdf)). Workers on open-ended (permanent) dispatch contracts rose to 41% of the total, from 37% in FY2020.

### Pricing: IT engineers bill at nearly twice the rate of clerical staff

The average bill rate was ¥26,257 per eight-hour day in FY2024 (+3.6%, the largest rise in five years); workers received ¥16,735 (+3.4%). The gross margin is about 30% after tax, most of which goes to social insurance (about 11%) and overheads (about 14%); operating margins are only 1–6% ([MHLW margin data](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11600000/000634367.pdf)).

| Role (¥ per 8-hour day, FY2024) | Bill rate | Worker pay |
| --- | --- | --- |
| IT and telecom engineers | 34,382 | 21,032 |
| Construction and civil engineers | 34,168 | 21,429 |
| Manufacturing engineers | 28,518 | 17,724 |
| Nurses | 23,428 | 15,913 |
| General clerical | 18,112 | 12,231 |
| Production line | 16,883 | 11,406 |
| Care workers | 16,282 | 11,093 |

Source: [MHLW dispatch report FY2024](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/001684019.pdf). In 2025, 77.9% of client firms accepted price increases ([JASSA](https://kyodonewsprwire.jp/release/202511058474)).

### Players: the big three are steady; engineering-staffing leaders went private

| Company | Latest scale | Segment | Recent development |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Recruit (Japan staffing) | ¥846.8bn FY2025 (+5.2%) | Generalist | FY2026 guidance +7.5% ([IR](https://file.recruit-holdings.com/files/ja/Recruit_202703Q1_summary_jp.pdf)) |
| Persol (Staffing unit) | ¥158.3bn in Q1 FY2026 (+3.4%) | Generalist | Volume flat, prices up 2.5% ([IR](https://www2.jpx.co.jp/disc/21810/140120260807514816.pdf)) |
| TechnoPro | ¥239.0bn FY2025/6 (+9.0%); 30,575 engineers | Engineering staffing | Taken private by Blackstone for about ¥507bn, Dec 2025 ([M&A Center](https://www.nihon-ma.co.jp/news/20250806_6028-12/)) |
| Outsourcing (now BREXA) | — | Engineering and manufacturing | Taken private by Bain Capital, Jun 2024 ([TSE notice](https://www2.jpx.co.jp/disc/24270/140120240604520548.pdf)) |
| UT Group | ¥166.9bn FY2026/3; operating profit +31.5% | Manufacturing staffing | Cut mid-term plan; entering permanent placement ([IR](https://www.ut-g.co.jp/id3neq81fx/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/release20251118.pdf)) |
| Fullcast | ¥77.2bn FY2025 (+12.6%) | Short-term work | Acquired a high-end placement business; set up HR tech unit ([IR](https://www.fullcastholdings.co.jp/assets/upload/2026/02/presentation_20254Q.pdf)) |
| Timee | ¥34.3bn FY2025/10; 14.2m registered workers | Spot-work app | Launched a placement service charging 30% of salary ([IR](https://www2.jpx.co.jp/disc/215A0/140120260611568108.pdf)) |

The boundaries between staffing, placement and spot work are blurring fast: staffing firms and spot-work apps are all moving into permanent placement.

### Regulation: no major overhaul, tighter equal-pay rules

No major amendment to the Worker Dispatch Act is before the Diet ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11600000/001725135.pdf)). From October 2026, agencies must tell workers in writing that they can request an explanation of pay gaps, and the equal-pay guideline now covers retirement allowances, family and housing allowances ([summary](https://jitsumu-guide.com/worker-dispatch-law-reform-2026/)). Spot work is regulated as direct employment: a contract forms on application, and cancellations require compensation ([MHLW notice](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11200000/001513165.pdf)).

### Supply and outlook

Registered job seekers fell for two years to 7.53 million in FY2024, while client sites grew 7.9% — the main reason bill rates are rising ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/001684019.pdf)). Labor-shortage bankruptcies among staffing firms hit a record 12 in FY2025. Growth ranks roughly: engineering staffing (volume and price both rising), construction site management, semiconductor manufacturing, care, then clerical (price up, volume flat). Automotive and light work are under pressure from tariffs and spot-work apps ([Yano Research](https://www.yano.co.jp/press-release/show/press_id/3931)).

## Foreign workers: policy and public attitudes

### 2.57 million workers, sources diversifying toward South and Southeast Asia

Japan had 2,571,037 foreign workers at the end of October 2025 (+11.7%), a record for the 13th straight year ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11655000/001646128.pdf)). Growth came mainly from skilled visas: Specified Skilled Worker (特定技能) holders rose 38.3% to 286,000, and Engineer/Specialist in Humanities/International Services (技術・人文知識・国際業務, the main white-collar visa) rose 13.8% to 468,000.

| Nationality (Oct 2025) | Workers | Share | Change |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Vietnam | 605,906 | 23.6% | +6.2% |
| China | 431,949 | 16.8% | +5.7% |
| Philippines | 260,869 | 10.1% | +6.2% |
| Nepal | 235,874 | 9.2% | +25.7% |
| Indonesia | 228,118 | 8.9% | +34.6% |
| Myanmar | 163,311 | 6.4% | +42.5% |
| Brazil | 134,645 | 5.2% | −1.1% |

Source: [MHLW, Attachment 3](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11655000/001646131.pdf). Manufacturing employs the most (635,000); healthcare and welfare is growing fastest (+25.6%). 63% of employers have fewer than 30 staff. Foreign residents totaled 4.28 million in June 2026, 3.4% of the population ([Kyodo](https://kumanichi.com/articles/2047152)).

### Visa framework: a 1.23 million cap, now binding in some sectors

In January 2026 the Cabinet expanded the skilled-worker program to 19 sectors and set intake caps through March 2029: 805,700 Specified Skilled Workers plus 426,200 under the new Employment for Skill Development (育成就労) program — 1,231,900 in total ([LNEWS](https://www.lnews.jp/2026/01/s0126105.html)).

| Sector | Estimated shortage | Skilled Worker cap | Skill Development cap | Total cap |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Industrial manufacturing | 683,700 | 199,500 | 119,700 | 319,200 |
| Construction | 360,000 | 76,000 | 123,500 | 199,500 |
| Food manufacturing | 288,400 | 133,500 | 61,400 | 194,900 |
| Nursing care | 259,300 | 126,900 | 33,800 | 160,700 |
| Agriculture | 389,000 | 73,300 | 26,300 | 99,600 |
| Food service | 256,000 | 50,000 | 5,300 | 55,300 |
| Truck and taxi driving | 287,900 | 22,100 | — | 22,100 |
| All 19 sectors | — | 805,700 | 426,200 | 1,231,900 |

Source: [Immigration Services Agency](https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/content/001453331.pdf). Food service became the first sector to hit its cap: new certificates stopped on 13 April 2026 ([ISA](https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/03_00176.html)).

The Employment for Skill Development program replaces the Technical Intern Training program from 1 April 2027. Workers may change employers only after one to two years, and such transfers may not go through private placement agencies ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11800000/001758852.pdf)) — this market is closed to recruiters.

### Policy is tightening on permanent residence

The Takaichi government's January 2026 package set the tone as "orderly coexistence" ([Prime Minister's Office](https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/pages/20260123choukan_gaikokujin.html)). Changes include:

- **Permanent residence:** from April 2027, applicants need 10 years' continuous residence, Japanese at CEFR B1 level, household income above the Japanese average for that household size, and a pension record ([ISA guideline](https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/10_00279.html)).
- **Naturalization:** residence requirement extended from 5 to 10 years from April 2026.
- **Fees:** the permanent-residence fee rose from ¥10,000 to ¥200,000 in October 2026; renewal fees now reach up to ¥75,000.
- **Compliance:** from June 2027, long-term non-payment of national health insurance will normally block visa renewal.
- **Business visas:** new arrivals on the Business Manager visa fell 80.9% in H1 2026 after requirements were tightened ([Kyodo](https://kumanichi.com/articles/2047152)).

### Employers are cautious; white-collar demand depends on Japanese ability

24.7% of companies employ foreign workers, but only 14.3% plan to start or expand — down 2.4 points. Language training and communication are the top concerns, each cited by about 56% ([Teikoku Databank](https://www.zaikei.co.jp/releases/3110067/)). Specified Skilled Workers earn about ¥211,000 a month, versus ¥330,000 for all workers ([ISA](https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/content/001444155.pdf)).

On the white-collar side, international students reached 408,000 (+21%), but only 37.9% of graduates found jobs in Japan; starting pay is typically ¥200,000–250,000 ([JASSO](https://www.jasso.go.jp/about/press/jp2026052901.html)).

### Public opinion has turned more cautious

| Poll | Period | Question | Result |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [Jiji Press](https://english.adnkronos.com/2026/07/23/focus-support-for-more-foreign-workers-in-japan-falls-below-60-pct/) | Apr 2024 → May 2026 | Support accepting more foreign workers | 71.8% → 58.2% |
| [Yomiuri–Waseda](https://www.waseda.jp/fsss/iass/news/2025/12/02/4982/) | Sep–Oct 2025 | Oppose actively accepting foreign labor | 59% (46% in 2024) |
| [University of Tokyo panel](https://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/content/400294120.pdf) | 2024 → 2026 | Oppose more foreigners settling permanently | 35.6% → 56.3% |
| [Waseda POPIP](https://prj-ipa.w.waseda.jp/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Press2025.pdf) | Nov–Dec 2025 | Agree more foreigners would harm public order | 73% |

The public separates temporary workers from permanent immigration: a majority still supports more workers, but opposes more settlement. Contrary to expectations, concern is rising fastest among people under 40. The Sanseito party won 14 upper-house seats in 2025 on a "Japanese First" platform; in February 2026 the LDP under Prime Minister Takaichi won 316 lower-house seats ([Tokyo Foundation](https://www.tkfd.or.jp/files/research/2025/Kato/20260306_Kato.pdf)). Takaichi has said the party is "absolutely not pursuing an immigration policy" while rejecting xenophobia.

### International context: Japan's pull is weakening

Foreign-born residents make up about 3% of Japan's population, against 20% in Germany, 15% in the US and an OECD average of 11.5% ([NLI Research](https://www.nli-research.co.jp/files/topics/83225_ext_18_0.pdf?site=nli)). In H1 2026, Vietnam sent almost as many workers to Taiwan (28,200) as to Japan (28,500), and its government cites the weak yen as a reason ([Dan Tri](https://dtinews.dantri.com.vn/print/20260619202624113.htm)). Japan is increasingly recruiting from Indonesia, Myanmar and Nepal.

## Impact of AI

### Adoption: 8% to 86% depending on what is measured

Reported generative-AI adoption in Japan ranges widely because surveys measure different things — from "used anywhere in the company" to "used daily by employees".

| Survey | Date | Sample | Measure | Result |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [MIC White Paper](https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/001082851.pdf) | Jan–Feb 2026 | 515 digitized firms | Use in any task | 86.4% (55.2% in 2024) |
| [Persol Career](https://monoist.itmedia.co.jp/mn/articles/2607/13/news030.html) | May 2026 | Managers at ¥100bn+ firms | AI agents in production | 48.3% |
| [Teikoku Databank](https://www.itmedia.co.jp/news/article/2605/15/1260515115/) | Mar 2026 | 10,312 firms | Use in operations | 34.5% (large 46.5%, small 28.0%) |
| [Tokyo Shoko Research](https://www.tsr-net.co.jp/data/detail/1202766_1527.html) | Apr 2026 | 6,327 firms | Company-wide rollout | 20.3% |
| [Recruit Works Institute](https://www.works-i.com/column/hataraku-ronten/detail055.html) | End-2025 | Workers | Daily use | 8.9% |

Japan lags peers: 58.8% of individuals have used generative AI, versus 75.6% in the US and Germany and 93.6% in China. Employers also train staff less — 26.9% of Japanese finance firms versus 60.5% in the US ([MHLW White Paper 2026](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/wp/hakusyo/roudou/26/dl/26-1-2-1.pdf)). AI's impact in 2026 is therefore concentrated in large-company white-collar work.

### Jobs: entry points are shrinking, not existing jobs

The government's 2026 Labour Economy White Paper finds no evidence of large AI-driven job losses through December 2025 ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/wp/hakusyo/roudou/26/dl/26-1-2-2.pdf)). But specific signals have appeared since mid-2025:

- **Clerical postings are falling.** Clerical job ads fell about 16% year on year in July 2025, the largest drop of any category; another tally shows −43.8% in February 2026, while IT specialist postings rose 10.6% ([Reuters](https://www.newsweekjapan.jp/articles/-/301260); [Robert Walters](https://www.robertwalters.co.jp/content/dam/robert-walters-redesign/country/japan/files/insights/monthly_market_update_apr2026.pdf)).
- **Graduate hiring is being cut at large firms.** For 2027, 23% of 111 major companies plan fewer graduate hires and 16% plan more — the first reversal in five years. Mitsubishi Electric cut graduate hiring about 22%, explicitly citing AI ([Kyodo](https://www.oanda.jp/lab-education/market_news/kn_2026041901000813/)).
- **Early-retirement programs are up but not attributed to AI.** Listed companies sought 20,781 voluntary retirees in FY2025 (2.5x), 70% of them profitable firms; none cited AI ([Tokyo Shoko Research](https://www.tsr-net.co.jp/data/detail/1202787_1527.html)).

Counter-evidence is equally strong: graduate openings still exceed graduates 1.62 to 1, and demand for AI talent is surging — AI roles paying over ¥10 million have grown about 3.5x in three years. METI projects a 2040 surplus of 4.4 million clerical workers and a shortfall of 3.4 million people able to use AI and robotics ([MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/wp/hakusyo/roudou/26/dl/26-1-2-2.pdf)). Unlike the US, where young graduates are most exposed, Japan's at-risk groups are clerical graduate hires at large firms and surplus mid-career staff.

### Recruiting technology: CV screening is breaking down

The HR-tech cloud market is about ¥169bn in FY2025 (+22%) ([Mic Research Institute](https://webtan.impress.co.jp/r/prtimes/items/000000108.000029825)). 74% of large companies use AI or HR tech in HR, against 26% of small ones ([HR Research Institute](https://www.hrpro.co.jp/research_detail.php?r_no=415)).

Candidate use of AI is forcing change. Only 3% of 2027 graduates do not plan to use generative AI in job hunting (55% two years earlier). Among firms using AI interviews, 86.7% have relaxed or dropped document screening because CVs no longer differentiate ([HR Research Institute](https://www.hrpro.co.jp/research_detail.php?r_no=427); [Leverages](https://jinjibu.jp/news/detl/26142/)). Japanese candidates are relatively accepting: only 11% say AI screening strongly discourages them from applying, versus 23% globally ([SIA](https://www.staffingindustry.com/news/global-daily-news/japans-workers-embrace-ai-as-employers-lag-on-upskilling)).

For agencies, AI is lowering the cost of sourcing, screening and outreach toward zero. In 2026, several AI-native platforms began offering subscription-based sourcing tools with no success fee, and AI copilots for agency consultants have launched ([innovaTopia](https://innovatopia.jp/tech-economy/tech-economynews/80024/); [BCN](https://www.bcnretail.com/market/detail/20260817_652581.html)). There is no hard evidence yet that large agencies have lost revenue to AI.

The regulatory line is unclear. MHLW has indicated that an AI service that screens candidates on the employer's behalf, or prioritizes certain candidates for interviews, may count as job placement and require a license ([Cabinet Office WG](https://www8.cao.go.jp/kisei-kaikaku/kisei/meeting/wg/2501_06ai/260213/ai07_0203.pdf)). Keidanren's April 2026 guidance — no adverse decisions on AI output alone, no gender or age inputs, disclose AI use to candidates — is becoming the de facto standard ([Keidanren](https://www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2026/016.pdf)).

### Policy and public mood: pro-AI, light on labor measures

The AI Promotion Act took full effect in September 2025 with no penalties ([White & Case](https://www.whitecase.com/sites/default/files/2026-04/japan-first-ai-legislation-becomes-law.pdf)). The revised AI Basic Plan of July 2026 targets ¥23.1tn in vertical-AI and ¥10.5tn in physical-AI investment by FY2040 ([Kyodo](https://www.oanda.jp/lab-education/market_news/kn_2026071501000587/)). Of the ¥502.7bn FY2026 AI budget, only ¥1.9bn (0.4%) goes to helping workers adapt ([Cabinet Office](https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/ai/yosan_8nendo.pdf)). The government frames AI as a fix for labor shortages, not a threat to jobs.

The public is relatively calm: only 29% of Japanese say AI products make them nervous, versus 64% of Americans ([Ipsos AI Monitor 2025](https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2025-06/Ipsos-AI-Monitor-2025_0.pdf)). AI-driven work reform is set to become an issue in the 2027 shunto, with employers pushing it and unions insisting job moves remain voluntary ([Kyodo](https://www.oanda.jp/lab-education/market_news/kn_2026090201001545/)).

## Market opportunities and risks for the recruitment industry

### The opportunity: a growing, fragmented market splitting at both ends

Recruitment-agency fees have grown about 11% a year for a decade, the top five or six firms hold only 20–30%, and a license costs little to obtain. The market is polarizing toward specialist high-end search and toward platforms; generalist agencies in the middle are being squeezed. Segment by segment:

| Segment | Demand signals | Fees and regulation | Fit with AI | Assessment |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| High-salary and executive (¥8m+) | JAC executive placements +31%; average fee per hire ¥1.03m (+10.9%); 70% of ¥10m+ earners got there by changing jobs | 30–35% contingency holds; retainers possible; least regulatory pressure | AI helps sourcing and long-lists; judgment stays human | Most attractive |
| IT, digital and AI talent | JAC digital placements +45%; IT pay settlements 8.28%; ¥10m+ AI roles up 3.5x in three years | Standard contingency; no special regulation | Skills are well-defined, so AI matching works best | Most attractive |
| Foreign white-collar professionals | 468,000 holders of the main white-collar visa (+13.8%); 408,000 international students, only 38% stay | Standard contingency for white-collar; blue-collar visa transfers barred from private agencies | Multilingual screening and cross-border sourcing suit AI | Attractive, if limited to white-collar |
| Healthcare and care | Care placements +25–29%; doctors −18%, nurses −10% | Fees 20–25%; fee cap likely; low client satisfaction | Matching is standardized, but political risk is high | Avoid contingency in doctors and nurses |
| Succession and PE portfolio leadership | Blackstone and Bain taking staffing firms private; succession-driven bankruptcies remain high; PE hiring expanding | Retained search; no specific regulation | Relationship-driven; AI only supports mapping | Selective, longer-term |

Sources: [JAC](https://ir.jac-recruitment.jp/ja/investors/news/auto_20260220566762/pdfFile.pdf); [National Tax Agency](https://www.nta.go.jp/publication/statistics/kokuzeicho/minkan2025/pdf/2025_001.pdf); [JILPT](https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/blt/backnumber/2026/10/other_05.html); [MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11655000/001646131.pdf); [Japan Medical Association](https://www.hospital.or.jp/site/news/file/1774494184.pdf); [Robert Walters](https://www.robertwalters.co.jp/content/dam/robert-walters-redesign/country/japan/files/others/RWJ-SS2026-Japanese.pdf).

Freelance and side-job placement is another growth area: Persol's unit grew 29%, and 72.5% of companies now allow side jobs ([Mynavi](https://career-research.mynavi.jp/reserch/20250930_101865/)). Its legal treatment differs from job placement and needs separate review.

### The risks

- **Pressure on the contingency fee model.** Direct recruiting grows 19–23% a year; mandatory fee disclosure since April 2025 erodes information advantages; AI tools are pushing the cost of sourcing toward zero, and subscription models now compete directly with 30–35% contingency fees.
- **Cooling demand.** The job-openings ratio has fallen from 1.31 to 1.18; employers are hiring more selectively; Persol's placement revenue fell 5% and the agency sentiment index dropped to 9.0 ([JESRA](https://www.jesra.or.jp/enquete/202607/)).
- **Regulatory uncertainty over AI.** AI services that screen or prioritize candidates may require a placement license, and the boundary is still being defined ([Cabinet Office WG](https://www8.cao.go.jp/kisei-kaikaku/kisei/meeting/wg/2501_06ai/260213/ai07_0203.pdf)).
- **Political risk around foreign talent.** Support for accepting more foreign workers fell from 71.8% to 58.2% in two years, and policy emphasis has shifted from filling shortages to maintaining order.
- **Healthcare fee cap.** A legal cap on medical and care placement fees is increasingly likely.

### What this means for players in the market

1. **Specialize.** Growth and pricing power are in high-salary, IT/digital and foreign white-collar talent. Greater Tokyo is the natural base: it has a third of all agencies, a quarter of foreign workers and the tightest job market.
2. **Diversify pricing.** Keep contingency fees for senior and hard-to-fill roles, and add subscription or hybrid pricing for volume roles and smaller clients. Platforms with mixed revenue have proved less sensitive to downturns ([Visional](https://www2.jpx.co.jp/disc/41940/140120241211537080.pdf)).
3. **Pair AI with consultants.** Let AI handle sourcing and first-round screening; consultants focus on client advisory and closing. Productivity benchmark: about ¥24m in revenue per consultant per year at JAC. Consultant retention is the bottleneck (JAC turnover rose to 11.6%).
4. **Build compliance in from the start.** Obtain the placement license, keep final decisions with the employer, disclose AI use to candidates, and exclude age and gender from AI inputs.
5. **Watch the calendar.** FY2025 official data comes in March 2027; the Employment for Skill Development program and new permanent-residence rules start in April 2027; a healthcare fee-cap decision may come by 2027. Useful leading indicators: the job-openings ratio, the agency sentiment index, doda's job-change openings ratio (2.55 in June 2026) and clerical postings.

## Sources and data caveats

### Key sources

- **Labor market:**[MIC Labour Force Survey](https://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/sokuhou/tsuki/pdf/gaiyou.pdf); [MHLW job placement statistics, Aug 2026](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/newpage_76397.html); [JILPT key statistics](https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/statistics/shuyo/0208.html); [BOJ Tankan, Sep 2026](https://www.boj.or.jp/statistics/tk/yoshi/tk2609.htm); [Teikoku Databank](https://www.tdb.co.jp/report/economic/20260817-laborshortage202607/); [Tokyo Shoko Research](https://www.tsr-net.co.jp/data/detail/1202729_1527.html)
- **Workforce:**[MIC Census 2025](https://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2025/kekka/pdf/outline_01.pdf); [MHLW Vital Statistics 2025](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/geppo/nengai25/dl/gaikyouR7.pdf); [Recruit Works Institute, Forecast 2040](https://www.works-i.com/research/report/item/forecast2040.pdf); [Persol Research Institute](https://digitalpr.jp/r/97163); [JILPT supply-demand projection](https://www.jil.go.jp/press/documents/20240311.pdf)
- **Wages:**[Rengo tallies via MHLW](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11200000/001739491.pdf); [MHLW Monthly Labour Survey](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/itiran/roudou/monthly/r08/2608p/dl/pdf2608p.pdf); [MHLW minimum wage FY2026](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11200000/001753404.pdf); [MHLW Wage Census 2025](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/itiran/roudou/chingin/kouzou/z2025/dl/14.pdf); [National Tax Agency](https://www.nta.go.jp/publication/statistics/kokuzeicho/minkan2025/pdf/2025_001.pdf)
- **Recruitment agencies:**[MHLW placement report FY2024](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11600000/001683019.pdf); [MHLW fee revenue trend](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11600000/001685251.pdf); [Yano Research](https://www.yano.co.jp/press-release/show/press_id/3942); [JESRA industry survey](https://www.jesra.or.jp/enquete/202607/); company IR for JAC, Visional, Persol, Recruit
- **Staffing:**[MHLW dispatch report FY2024](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/001684019.pdf); [MHLW margin data](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11600000/000634367.pdf); [Yano Research](https://www.yano.co.jp/press-release/show/press_id/3931); company IR for Recruit, Persol, TechnoPro, UT Group, Fullcast, Timee
- **Foreign workers:**[MHLW foreign employment report](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/newpage_68794.html); [Immigration Services Agency caps](https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/content/001453331.pdf); [ISA permanent-residence guideline](https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/10_00279.html); [Prime Minister's Office policy package](https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/pages/20260123choukan_gaikokujin.html); polls by Jiji, Yomiuri–Waseda and the University of Tokyo (linked above)
- **AI:**[MIC Information and Communications White Paper 2026](https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/001082851.pdf); [MHLW Labour Economy White Paper 2026](https://www.mhlw.go.jp/wp/hakusyo/roudou/26/dl/26-1-2-2.pdf); [Keidanren AI-in-HR report](https://www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2026/016.pdf); [Cabinet Office AI budget](https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/ai/yosan_8nendo.pdf)

### Caveats

- **Timing.** Official FY2025 data for placement and staffing will not be published until March 2027; FY2024 is the latest official year.
- **Definitions differ.** Yano Research and MHLW size both markets differently (white-collar placement ¥449bn vs. all placement ¥983.5bn; staffing ¥9.32tn vs. ¥9.90tn). Dispatched-worker counts differ between MHLW (2.2 million) and the Labour Force Survey (1.58 million). Teikoku Databank and Tokyo Shoko Research define labor-shortage bankruptcies differently.
- **Secondary sources.** The IPSS population projections by year, some MHLW figures, and several AI-adoption figures were taken from reputable secondary reproductions and should be checked against the originals before external publication.
- **Industry conventions.** The 30–35% contingency fee is market practice, not an official statistic; no public data exists on retained-search fees or a 2026–2030 agency market forecast.
- **Exchange rate.** Figures are in yen; ¥100 million = ¥0.1bn.

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